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LAW AND MR. SmITH.

By Max Radin. The Bobbs-Merrill Com-

pany, Indianapolis, 1938. Pp. 333. Price: $3.oo.
Here in jurisprudence made popular a distinguished law teacher comes
to the defense of judges and lawyers. Mr. Smith, addressee of the book, is
any layman. When in deciding a case about airplane flights the United
States Supreme Court relies on a statute passed in 1790 and an English
case of vintage 1773, Mr. Smith (so a blurb informs us) throws down his
evening paper and erupts anger and disgust. For such emotions Professor
Radin seeks to substitute "confidence" and sympathetic understanding. His
purpose is to explain to Mr. Smith what law is, how it got that way, and
how it functions in certain traditional fields. He divides his discourse,
accordingly, into three main parts.
Part One on The Nature of Law (6 chapters, 46 pages) begins, in
a manner not unknown to social scientists, with Alexander Selkirk marooned alone on his happy island. Here there is no law. But introduce
even one other person, a fortiori millions, and rules become necessary to
keep down conflicts and provide that certainty without which life is intolerable. Rules are habits made conscious. Of the multitudinous rules in
any society those are legal which a court will enforce. Law now is a
prophecy of future court action. Courts are made up of judges, uninspired
human beings "extremely like the rest of us." Judges do not do as they
please; they bow to precedents, statutes, principles and justice. Precedent,
logical fitness, gets more deference than justice both because justice is often
indifferent and because while "we can always recognize consistency," "we
cannot generally recognize justice." '1 Still justice-high and low-gets
some hearing. Rules from precedents do not form a complete system and,
furthermore, judges are clever in the art of distinguishing. Low justice is
custom, common agreement. High justice, it later appears, is what we
take on faith.
Less arid is Part Two (io chapters, 18o pages) on the Development
of Legal Institutions and Ideas. Primitive societies, North American
Indians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Israelites, Greeks and Romans are all on
parade as the author demonstrates how "law" has developed from an
"undifferentiated mass" of "morals, manners, religion, propriety and communal self-protection." Chapter headings are reliable indices of content
and style: Judges and Governors, The Mystery of Procedure, The
Interstices of Procedure and the Growth of Codes, The Sage and His
Authority, The Concentration of Legal Authority, The Law Attempts
to Get Above Itself, Good Law and Better Law, The Insoluble Problem (of getting "the facts"). Two additional chapters contain more
explicit contributions to the author's general apologia. In Legal Authority
Becomes a Command he points out that judges in applying a statute must,
because of the inherent ambiguity of words, "interpret" whether they will
or not and that in interpreting it is perfectly "right and proper", even inevitable, for them to consider the practical consequences, the results desirable
or undesirable, of competing interpretations. In Authority Is Content to
Be Persuasive he expands his defense of precedent. Its basis is in human
i. Professor Radin elsewhere suggests that it is not always easy to recognize consistency.
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nature. Economy of effort apart, "a definite trait of the human mind impels
us to prefer to our unguided, self-derived judgment the direction or protection of a mind we regard as better." 2 Furthermore, "consistency is a real
and powerful constituent of justice"; reasonable expectations of the public
are not lightly to be denied. Happily precedent's "binding quality", "a late
and special development" and most offensive to laymen, is fast disappearing.
Part Three (7 chapters, 87 pages) on The Substance of Law offers
brief essays, oriented largely toward the past, on torts, contracts, property
and crimes. Property created by the Supreme Court under the aegis of
"due process" gets a single brief paragraph. Though raising "the most
crucial legal issue of the future", such property is expressly exempted from
the author's survey. In two final chapters the author vigorously reaffirms
his conviction that lawyers should not be abolished. They are indispensable
so long as we cannot get back to that happy island with which our story
began. The thing for the layman to do to promote "the growth of the law
and the discovery of justice" is to discard his "unreasonable attitude of
irritation and suspicion." What we need is more "confidence" from laymen
and more "persistent thinking" by lawyers. Law is not "a mysterious
instrument by which miracles can be effected." A court "is not properly
supposed to have as its purpose the task of reforming our social life." That
is not a legal function.
Such is Professor Radin's thesis. In obvious contrast with his philosophy of acceptance are the iconoclastic protests of Frank and Arnold. A
reader's preference is likely to depend upon his social values. Professor
Radin is an accredited member of the "realistic school" of legal writers.8
Right-wing members of this group will be pleased with his performance.
Left-wing members will tend to think his benedictions indiscriminate. He
could have defended our democratic governmental framework, with its
peaceful settlement of disputes by arbitration and compromise, without defending its incubus of ideology and folklore. 4 He could have assigned a
much greater creative, reforming, function to judges. His definition of
"law" as prophecy, as doctrine, is insight from a very limited perspective
only. From a broader perspective any differentiation of "law" from morals,
manners, economics and so forth is illusory. Indeed the greatest present
concern of the layman is with that growing edge of social change where
"law" and "economics" are hopelessly intermingled. Some probing into the
"conflicts" which here produce "law" and into the kind of "law" so produced might have arrested Mr. Smith's attention. Sed qucere. When the
definitive theory of social change comes to be formulated, it scarcely seems
probable that a high place will be given to books either praising or damning
lawyers. Such books, with rare exceptions, are born to waste their fragrance on the desert air.
Myres S. McDougal jf
By Irston R. Barnes. F. S.
Crofts & Co., New York, 1938. Pp. xx, 984. Price: $7.00.
Would a medical student make a case study of wounds by studying
court decisions dealing with the liability of doctors for the proper treatment
CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION.

'IAssociate Professor of Law, Yale University.

The phrasing is from an earlier chapter.
3. Cf. Professor Llewellyn's famous roll call (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 at
4. He does state that much of our lawyers' "jargon" is today "unnecessary".
2.
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of wounds? This is not a play on the word "case". It is merely an analogy
reductio ad absurdum to the plan of this book to provide for undergraduates,
majoring in economics, a case study of the economics of public utility regulation by the use of decisions dealing with such regulation. It must be
admitted that economic predilections of judges play a part in their determinations of controversies, but to resort to the language of their decisions
for a study of economics is, putting it mildly, stretching the point a little
too far.
The author uses well known Supreme Court decisions to convey the
public utility concept and to show the constitutional bounds of the respective
spheres of influence of the Federal Government as contrasted to state governments and of courts as contrasted to commissions. The material on the
actual regulation of public utilities by commissions, particularly with regard
to accounting practices and rate structures, is valuable. The problem of
valuation appears to be dealt with at too much length. Although the conflict between emphasis upon reproduction cost and upon prudent investment
has produced an endless amount of litigation, even lawyers are beginning
to realize that such questions can be settled better around a table than in a
court. The materials on the holding company and on inter-corporate relations include recent rulings of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Nor does the author overlook the Federal Power Commission. The Federal
Communications Commission is not specifically treated except that the
American Telephone & Telegraph case 1 in which uniform accounts were
prescribed for certain telephone companies, is dealt with under the chapter
dealing with the regulation of accounts. The work concludes with decisions
and excerpts from a report of the New York Power Authority dealing with
the public ownership of utilities.
The book contains one hundred sixty-two cases. Much irrelevant
matter is deleted from them. Generally, each case is preceded by a short
statement of the facts or of the manner in which it arose. Each chapter
begins with an introductory note which has been carefully prepared and is
undoubtedly of great assistance to undergraduates. There are no footnotes
except references to the dates of the decisions and to the personnel of each
court. Perhaps it is a legal technicality to point out that a footnote would
have been appropriate to indicate that the decision of the Missouri Public
Service Commission in Fulton v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. was
reversed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 2 There is a bibliography containing hosts of references to economic, accounting, social and political
material.
Whether the book serves well its didactic purpose in an undergraduate
school is a question which the writer will make no pretense to answer.
Certainly, however, it would seem that if undergraduate schools deem it
worthy to emphasize legal phases of a given subject, it would be appropriate
that it should be done by a special series of discussions by a teacher or practitioner of law rather than by the use of court decisions by a teacher of
i. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 (1936).
2.

State ex rel. Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm., 93 S. W.

(2d)

675 (Mo. 1936). The question, treated by the Commission, of discrimination by public
utilities against municipalities and cooperatives is discussed in Packel, Utility Service

to Cooperatives (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 370, 384.
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economics or accounting. The same suggestion no doubt is applicable to
the law schools which might draw upon economists, accountants and other
specialists to present specialized phases of the subjects dealt with in law
schools.
Israel Packel t
THE LAw OF NAT oNs.

By Marcellus Donald A. R. von Redlich. World
League for Permanent Peace, Phoenix, 1937. Pp. xxiii, 64o. Price:
$10.00.
The form of this book, in its physical and material attributes, is attractive. In spite of its size it is light in weight and easily held for reading.
Its type is clear, and the paper reflects no facets of light to hurt the eyes of
him who burns the midnight oil. Some mention of these points is due to
prospective purchasers by every reviewer.
The title--"The Law of Nations"--however, is somewhat misleading.
For the book does not deal comprehensively nor solely with international
law, but chiefly with two branches of it,-treaty making, and the diplomatic
and consular officers.
It begins with five introductory chapters, which serve their purpose
admirably. The first briefly discusses the history, definition, sources and
evidence of international law, and explains its application to states as its
subjects. The second chapter takes up the law of recognition of states, a
timely subject because of the flood of recent litigations before the law courts
of the various nations, particularly in the United States of America, whose
Federal Government did not recognize the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Russia for a decade. In logical sequence, Chapters III and IV deal,
respectively, with international relations and with some important periods
in the history of international relations and diplomacy. Chapter V concludes the introductory chapters under the caption of "Special Inherent
Powers of Sovereignty", in which the author emphasizes the police power
of governments.
These preliminary chapters are not exhaustive but they will be helpful
to a reader who is taking up for the first time a critical study of international
law, and who has not fully realized the absence of any common superior
over the sixty odd independent states of the world. The consequences of
the absence of such an authority are often surprising to one who has been
accustomed to regard all branches of law as analogous to national or municipal law. For international law is not law at all in the strict Austinian sense
because of the lack of any legislative or enforcing authority over the states
which are its subjects. The classification of international law as "law"
must be based upon other considerations, so ably advanced by the late Sir
Henry Maine, and more recently by Dr. H. Lauterpacht.
With Chapter VI, Dr. von Redlich leaves the general field of international law, and, by way of interlude, takes up an exposition of the powers
and practices of the United States Government under its constitutional limitations. Chapter VII continues the interlude with a discussion almost
entirely on the last six constitutional amendments.
Chapters VIII, IX and X form a division in themselves. They are
really studies in comparative law rather than in international law. From
their titles one would expect a discussion of the powers of the United States
f Member of the bar, Philadelphia.
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Government to make and terminate treaties, to conduct foreign relations,
and to exercise war powers. The text, however, treats not only of the
United States Government in these fields, but also compares the powers
and practices of other governments.
Now this comparison of governmental limitations is not, strictly speaking, international law. But it does offer a realistic and practical approach
to the study of international law, because it shows a reader, who is not
familiar with the conduct of international relations, the difficulties with
which the practical statesman must cope in negotiating a treaty, such as:
the limitations upon his power fixed by his own government; the everpresent pressure of popular opinion, which has recently led to the submission
of important treaties to the legislature for approval, even in states where
the executive alone has authority to conclude treaties; and the influence of
politics and policy in working out a treaty, which, when it comes into force,
will be another possible source from which a rule of international law may
be deduced.
The remainder of the book deals with the diplomatic and consular
services, and with international arbitration. It is through diplomatic channels that states carry on most of their international relations and adjust
most of their daily differences and difficulties. Here again the author has
departed from a strict consideration of international law, and, as in the
previous section, has devoted himself to a cognate branch. His history and
discussion of the diplomatic office is filled with incident and example, so that
it becomes somewhat confused and the thread of the logical development is
lost.
Now both the negotiating of treaties and the daily work of the diplomatic and consular officers lies in the field of policy, and outside the field of
international law. That is why I said the title of the book is misleading.
Nevertheless, there is much international law which applies to both.
One might draw broad lines instead of narrow ones and say that both
subjects fall in the borderland where international policy and international
law overlap each other. This is familiar ground to Dr. von Redlich. He
dealt with it in his book International Law as a Substitute for Diplomacy.
In the narrow sense, such a substitution is quite impossible. But there is
a relationship. For out of the accomplishments of diplomacy and treaty
making, which is the execution of policy and not law, there does grow a
body of practices which become not only a source of international law, but
also that body of practices somehow itself conforms to and in a sense becomes international law, in somewhat the same way as writs and customs
wove themselves into the body of municipal law. This is one method by
which international law grows and may account for Dr. von Redlich's
excursions into fields beyond the strict borders of his subject, though he
does not say so.
To sum up, then, as a presentation of The Law of Nations this book is
neither thorough nor complete. But it does give a practical, though sketchy,
picture of two fields which have contributed to the growth of international
law, and these two fields have been presented in their relations to the United
States Constitution and the frames of other governments, from which a
reader may learn why international law works as well, or as ill, as it does.
Charles Chauncey Savage, Jr.
t Member of the bar, Philadelphia.
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THE RIsE OF A NEw FEDERALISM. By Jane Perry Clark. Columbia University Press, New York, 1938. PP. 347. Price: $3.50.
By our American federalism the founding fathers attempted to resolve
the most dangerous conflict that arose in the Constitutional Convention of
1787-that between advocates of a strong central government and defenders
of state sovereignty. But the problem was more than that, for the American
nation was born of rebellion against government as such, and founded on
the belief that certain areas of individual rights are and must be beyond
the reach of any government whatever, whether federal or state. And, in
practice, the principle of federalism thus devised has been invoked both to
free the states from federal "encroachment", and to relieve the Federal
Government from state "intrusion". Apparently it was felt that dreaded
collision between state and federal authorities could best be avoided, and
differences more easily reconciled, by presuming the existence of a strip of
unoccupied jurisdiction between the two divisions of government. At any
rate, vague areas, "twilight zones", grew up between the two jurisdictions
in which individuals and groups might take refuge thus escaping any
political control.
These matters, though important, are not Miss Clark's primary concern. Her aim is "to indicate and describe some of the ways in which the
Federal and state governments have cooperated and how effective their joint
activity has been." There is good reason for this approach in everyday
facts, past and present, no less than in history and common sense. The
situation now makes the author's treatment both timely and realistic for as
she observes: "It has become increasingly clear that many of the controversies over the supposedly mutually exclusive alternatives of federal as
opposed to state power are sterile and that to conceive of the Federal and
state governments as moving in never-coinciding orbits of action is unduly
to over-simplify the complicated interplay of the forces of government
today. .

.

. No dyke of formal governmental separation is strong enough

to prevent germs, floods, kidnappers, and airplanes from wandering across
state lines. In dealing with all these matters and with a thousand others,
the streams of federal and state interest constantly intermingle."
This plain statement has only recently been acknowledged by the
Supreme Court; indeed, on occasion it has been expressly denied. Nevertheless, Miss Clark deliberately chooses to regard the Federal and state
governments not as separate and rival agencies, but as necessary instruments
for handling the manifold problems of government today. The most striking
aspect of her study (especially in view of various isolated Supreme Court
opinions and decisions) is the scope and gradual growth of federal-state
cooperation. Of course this was not accidental; complete independence of
Federal and state government could never have been intended by the
founding fathers; and certainly no such absurdity has been attained in
practice. Indeed, the primary characteristic of federal-state relations
throughout our national history is not antagonism and separatism but
cooperation.
Chapter headings of the volume under review suggest the author's
theme: Informal Cooperation, including discussion and conferences, exchange of advisory and educational facilities, temporary loans of equipment
and personnel; Agreements and Contracts, relating to statistical and research programs, costs, services and personnel; Cooperative Use of Government Personnel, in the World War and Civilian Conservation Corps,
and in the enforcement of prohibition and the first Child Labor Law;
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Inter-Dependent Law and Administration, as in the Wilson and WebbKenyon Acts and in the Conservation of Oil and Wild Life Acts. More
than half of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of the problem of
federal-grants-in-aid to the states, treating the method and allocation of such
grants, federal requirements and supervision of the states enjoying federal
aid, etc.
Miss Clark wisely delimits her subject. Cooperation between judicial
branches of the Federal and state governments is omitted as involving
legal and organizational matters rather than administrative questions. Even
in the administrative field further studies are needed before the entire
pattern of our federal-state arrangements "can emerge with clarity and
distinctness." The author suggests specifically the need for an examination
of various regional arrangements by which the Federal Government gives
weight to state and local considerations while retaining ultimate control in
its own hands; also as for a comparative study of the regional devices
related to cooperative federal-state arrangements in the same field, to the
end that we may know more of the relative constitutional and administrative
effectiveness of the two schemes.
A word of commendation is due the author for the clarity with which
she has organized and presented her material. By omitting the usual bric-abrac scholarship she has made an important contribution to knowledge without subjecting the reader to the punishment he usually has to endure if he
is to enjoy the fruits of much authorship in our constitutional studies. It is
hoped that Miss Clark will follow up her own suggestions for further research in this field.
Alpheus Thomas Mason "
HANDBOOK OF TiE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

By Judson A. Crane. West

Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1938. Pp. x, 535. Price: $5.00.
The recent text on Partnership by Professor Crane is one of the best
treatises on that subject that has been published in several decades. His
discussion of the general rules of partnership law are accurate and concise,
at times a little too concise. He cites most of the old and a great many of the
recent leading cases on the law of partnership. His conclusions on the whole
are absolutely satisfactory, and anyone who wishes to exhaust the point
under consideration is referred to the leading cases and law review articles
which enable one to find what the courts and learned writers have said on
the point under investigation. Of course, no one would expect Professor
Crane to exhaust in a Hornbook text the law of partnership and joint-stock
companies---especially if the Massachusetts trust is embraced in the latter
term. He has done a fine job, and the lawyers and professors of law
who teach Partnership or Business Organization are very grateful to him
for what he has done in bringing together and making so accessible the
materials that we need in our daily work.' The treatise is based on the
Uniform Partnership Act, but as that Act, in general purports to codify the
common law, and as Professor Crane discusses the common law of most of
the states where it differs with the Uniform Act, the volume is equally as
valuable in the states that have not adopted the Uniform Act as in the
twenty-six states that have enacted that statute.
t Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
i. The writer of this review is especially indebted to Professor Crane, as it seems
evident that an unusual number of Texas cases are cited in the notes to the text.
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The review of a text is perhaps expected to point out such defects as
are apparent to the reviewer. There are no serious misstatements of law
in Professor Crane's book. However, in the opinion of the writer there are
a few minor objections that should be called to the attention of the reader.
On page 18 the statement is made that "as between mere co-owners
the relation is not fiduciary." If this quotation correctly states the law, A
would have no right to complain where B induced A to purchase with him
a tract of land belonging to C without disclosing to A that C had agreed to
give B a 2o% commission for selling the land. In this case B acquired his
one-half interest for much less than A, and some courts would give A relief
on the ground that even between pre-co-owners the relation is fiduciary.'
The statement in note 33 on page 33 that "In Texas a married woman
can become a partner only by securing the removal of her disabilities," is
too inclusive. For many years under the Texas statute a married woman
has bad "control" of her separate property and that part of the statute was
declared constitutional by the Texas Supreme Court." Her capacity to
enter into partnership contracts is subject only to those limitations which
exist upon her capacity to enter into contracts generally. 4 However, it may
be correct to say that if she enters into a strictly commercial partnership she
must comply with the Texas statute providing for the removal of her disability.5
If the following phrase were added to the last sentence in Section ii
its meaning would be clarified: "when war is declared by either nation."
On page 40 it is stated that, "It [a partnership] must be a single business."
According to this statement A and B could not form a partnership to
grow cotton, gin the cotton that they grow as partners, gin for the public,
buy lint cotton on the open market and purchase and fatten cattle for the
market. Why not? Possibly Professor Crane would say that A and B
formed four partnerships. But suppose each partner put in a lump sum
to be used for the above purposes and no separate accounts are kept. Are
the partners not conducting four "businesses", although having formed
only one partnership? On page 43 we find the statement that, "The partnership association is formed for the purpose of deriving an immediate profit
from the business carried on." Why cannot two cattlemen form a partnership to raise registered cattle even though they fully realize that they must
carry on the business at a loss for several years until their reputation is
established and their special breed of cattle becomes well known? Many
of such partnerships are formed, not only in the cattle business, but other
businesses, especially where the partnership is formed to plant young trees
and develop an orchard.
On page 95 the author states that persons who deal with a defectively
organized corporation on the assumption that the company was properly
incorporated should be barred from holding the stockholders personally
liable on "equitable grounds". Would it not be more in accordance with the
understanding of the parties to state that the creditor is barred by reason
on an "implied contract"? On the same page in defining the prerequisites
of a de facto corporation, the author states that one essential is "an existing
statute". Practically all authorities state this essential as a "valid statute".
Possibly the author had in mind that an unconstitutional statute is null and
:2. See dictum in Stenian v. Tashjian, 178 Cal. 623, 625, 174 Pac. 883, 885 (i9z8.
3. Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
4. Letfin v. Jeffers, 52 S. W. (2d) 81 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932), ii TEx. L. REv. 8i.
S. Hirshfeld & Co. v. Evans, 127 Tex. 254, 93 S. W. (2d) 148 (1936).
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void, and, therefore, is not "an existing statute". But is an unconstitutional
statute not an "existing statute", at least, until the Supreme Court declares
it unconstitutional? It remains and "exists" in the statutes of the state and
in at least one sense of the above phrase is "an existing statute". On page
97 the author states that "a corporation has authority to act only in the
state in which it is incorporated." Would it not be more accurate and in
keeping with recent authorities to say that a corporation has authority to
act in a foreign state unless conditions precedent to its acting in the foreign
state have been prescribed by the Legislature of that state?
On page 252 the author states that "the release may take the form of a
covenant not to sue." Is a covenant not to sue "a release"? If that question should be answered in the negative the word "agreement" should be
substituted for the word "release". On page 349 it is stated that if the
agreement of dissolution is silent on whether the purchasing partner assumes the obligations of the firm "it is presumed that the continuing partner
assumes the burden." The leading case cited for the above proposition goes
no further than to hold that if the debts of the firm are subtracted from the
assets in determining the purchase price of the partner's interest, that fact
is some evidence that the purchaser assumed the debts of the partnership.
Suppose the purchasing partner pays one-half of what the assets are worth
without referring to the debts of the firm. In such a case would the courts
hold that there is "a presumption" that he assumed the debts of the firm?
In Texas even though the purchasing partner assumes the debts of the firm
both parties are still principal debtors as to the creditors of the firm even
after notice of dissolution is given to the creditors.' That holding is opposed
to Professor Crane's idea of what the law should be as stated on page 350
of his text.
These technical criticisms of Professor Crane's text do not detract
from the value of his treatise. He deserves a great deal of credit for having
done such a fine job.
Ira P. Hildebrand t

By Clarence C. Dill. National
Law Book Co., Washington, 1938. Pp. x, 353. Price: $6.00.
The real laws of radio are the natural phenomena,-as inexplicable as
they are unchangeable. The radio wave travels i86,ooo miles a second. It
travels seven times around the earth in one second. It travels a million
times as fast as a sound wave. It passes through a vacuum or through
otherwise impenetrable solids. It travels farther at night than during the
day. There are only ninety-five wave lengths. These and other scientific
facts, some not yet observed and most not understood, combine to create
what is commonly referred to as the miracle of radio.
We cannot legislate, any more than we can pass miracles. There is
no appeal from the judgment that grows out of these phenomena. They
have the compulsion of the supreme law. Man must create his own feeble
law to suit him. It is accommodation to the inevitable.
Thus in an era when law adjusts itself to social change we find new
law adjusting itself to scientific necessity. One might stop to reflect upon
the undebatable necessity of such adjustment to physical science in contrast
RADIo LAw: PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE.

t Dean of the Law School, University of Texas.
6. Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Wells, go Tex. iio (i896).
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to the debate which rages about the struggle of the law to adjust itself to
social science.
The value of Senator Dill's book is that it expounds the practice and
procedure by which man harnesses the forces of radio in the public interest.
It deals solely with adjective law,-how radio licenses are obtained; the engineering problems to be solved before a license is granted; the interference
of radio waves and their effect upon the granting of licenses, and other
related problems. But the adjective law in radio has a dignity beyond that
of any other branch of law, for, as indicated, the procedural law has evolved
from the substantive principles of scientific law. It is no mere adjunct
devoted to orderly process. It encompasses the very principles of public
welfare which make it the tool and the finished product created by it, all at
the same time.
The author traces the growth of governmental control of radio from
Chief justice Taft's reluctance to pass upon the subject at all because "it
seems like dealing with something supernatural", to the Radio Act of 1927
and the Communications Act of 1934.
Congress acquired its right over radio through a broad interpretation
of the commerce clause. The government does not regulate the arts and
sciences as such. The ruling that the transmission of intelligence by telegraph was commerce, provided the basis for normal extension of the doctrine. The courts held that radio was the sightless courier of the air
performing "between the stations without visible highway, the functions
previously executed by electricity only when confined to wires as a conducting medium."
Congress has created a Federal Communications Commission composed of seven members which regulates all interstate and foreign wire and
radio communications. The Commission may grant or refuse application
for licenses, renew, modify, revoke or transfer licenses. The Communications Act of 1934 together with the Rules and Regulations and the interpretive decisions of the court constitute the law of radio as it is practiced
before the Commission. It is to the exposition of this exclusive branch of
law that the book is addressed.
Broadcasting stations are not regulated as public utilities. They determine their own programs, fix their own charges and sell time to whomsoever they desire. But, they are not free from all restrictions. The statute
abolished the property right of user. A condition for obtaining a license is
the waiver by the licensee of any claim that the use of a frequency gives any
right beyond the period for which the license is granted. Since the Commission can refuse to grant or renew a license, it exercises an effective
although indirect control over broadcasting. This power is prescribed by
statute. Equal treatment must be afforded political candidates in their
endeavors to buy radio time (a requirement not applicable to newspapers
because they are not so limited in number). No obscene or indecent language may be broadcast. Above all, the statutory test for the granting of
a license is that the needs of the public in a particular locality be served by
the proposed station. The standard is convenience and necessity combined
with fitness and ability to serve. The Commission has encouraged independent broadcasting stations as distinguished from chain broadcasting, and
has often issued licenses based upon the need for independent program
service over a large area. However, experience has shown that most of
these independent stations affiliate themselves with the national broadcasting chains. The statute gives authority to the Commission "to make special
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regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting", and
the author predicts that the Commission or Congress will exercise special
regulatory power in the future.
The greatest difficulty confronting an applicant for a new broadcasting
station is the engineering problem. If the proposed station is so close to
another station in miles, or so close in kilocyclical separation of frequencies
that interference will result, the license will be denied. Engineering testimony must therefore be presented in order to establish by actual tests, that
because of the poor conductivity of signals in the proposed area, the theoretical mileage separation is not actually necessary. Or it may be shown
that by the erection of what is called "a directional antenna" the radio
signals of the proposed station will be suppressed in the direction of the
station with which there would be interference otherwise.
The Commission apparently does not regard the expert testimony of
engineers as free from the influence of their retainer. It maintains its own
engineer and also counsel.
In most European countries radio is the exclusive domain of the Government, probably because it is feared that the power of radio communica-,
tion might be used against the Government. The United States recognizes
private ownership in radio but maintains a scrupulous surveillance of its
exercise. Owners must be citizens and of financial responsibility; they
obtain only a limited license subject to revocation or withdrawal. The
power to terminate or refuse the renewal of a license is equivalent to control
much broader than the mere protestations of lack of censorship would indicate. Such power should exist and be vested in a government agency free
(though the author does not mention it) from all political influence. The
quasi judicial nature of the Commission gains in importance when it is
remembered that the well-established rules on appeal from discretionary
orders apply in this instance. The courts have imposed restrictions upon
themselves in reviewing discretionary orders which give to the Commission
power to commit error without correction if only the injustice is not so
flagrant as to be deemed arbitrary. Further, the courts insist upon the
most technical requirements on appeal from the Commission's orders, and
any defect in the record is fatal. There may be no quarrel with these rules
for their alternatives present even greater dilemmas, but they bespeak a
responsibility which must be exercised with utmost integrity.
Senator Dill writes with extreme simplicity. Not only each chapter, but
each thought has its own subtitle expressing subconsciously the technique
of the radio announcer who assists the audience in digesting the presentation
by anticipatory comment. The author has set forth the objective of his
work as the presentation of the theory of radio together with enough history
of the development of radio law to make it possible for the legal practitioner
to handle radio cases before the Commission in an intelligent manner. As
the Senator who had much to do with the writing and passage of the basic
Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, and as a legal
practitioner who for the past several years has specialized in the practice of
radio law, the author is equipped with authoritative knowledge to attain his
objective. The promise to the reader is fulfilled.
Louis Nizer.t
t Member of the bar, New York City.
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LAWYER: ESSAYS IN DEMOCRACY. By F. Lyman Windolph. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1938. Pp. vii,
159. Price: $1-50.
It is a genuine delight, especially to a young country lawyer who can't
help feeling that the book is continually slapping him on the back, to have
the opportunity of reviewing the reflections of a mature advocate who has
discovered that the fullest experience, as well as the happiest, comes only
to the lawyer who "performs every sort of legal service for every sort of
client" (Mr. Windolph's definition of a "country lawyer", whether he practice in a town or a village). The author, who is known to the profession
throughout the state as a leader of the Lancaster County bar, has been
reared in the courts where Thaddeus Stevens and James Buchanan once
strove, and now in the ripeness of his retrospect he openly rejoices in a
heritage and an experience which are no longer available to the metropolitan
practitioner. As they turn Mr. Windolph's pages, the city men will
surely not escape a wistful feeling that they have missed something of the
best, both in practicing law and in sheer living, while the outlanders jubilate
that they are what they are.
But only a few of the sparkling essays grouped in this little book are
particularly concerned with the practice of law in the country (or more
specifically, in a large inland town, as far as Mr. Windolph's own practice
is in point). In the others a number of common problems of jurisprudence,
constitutional law, and political theory, as well as the problem of just plain
living in a democratic society, are thoughtfully and gracefully discussed.
For this country lawyer's style is as fluid as his argument is penetrating.
In defending the jury system, for example, he engages in combat with
Jerome Frank on the much mooted issue of jurors versus judge and proves
himself a wholly competent adversary for the cosmopolitan author of Law
and the Modern Mind. (One cannot help wondering whether their divergence of opinion may not somehow be related to the fact that Lancaster
County jurors are of a type which Mr. Frank rarely finds in New York
City.)
Mr. Windolph's essay on Defending a Bad Cause is as fine a piece
as anything that has been written in the field of legal ethics. Having
adopted as his canon the proposition that in any case, whether civil or
criminal, an advocate may properly do and say on his client's behalf whatever the client might properly do and say on his own behalf if he possessed
the requisite legal training and skill, the author's exposition of this rule
exhibits at once both a greater realism and a higher morality than anything
this reviewer has encountered in the standard law school readings in legal
ethics. By this criterion he rightly censures the defense of Courvoisier by
Charles Philips and is even obliged to reject the advice which Baron Parke
gave to the defendant's counsel in that case. Still more bluntly does he
repudiate the doctrine of Bishop Paley, that "there are falsehoods that are
no lies . . .a criminal pleading not guilty; an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his client's cause . . .no confidence is
destroyed, because none is reposed; no promise to speak the truth is vio(5o6)
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lated, because none is given." It should be disconcerting to critics of the
legal profession to find a lawyer insisting on a more rigorous morality than
a theologian's.
Exceptionally interesting is this country lawyer's attitude toward the
exercise of judicial power which has produced the second (or actual) Fourteenth Amendment in place of the first (or intended) one. In flavor reminiscent of Morris Ernst's recent book, The Ultimate Power, this essay presents a point of view not altogether to be expected from a man who rejoices
in labelling himself a conservative. True, he makes no recommendation for
abridgment of the power of judicial review; he takes the matter of fact
approach that as long as we have judges they will make law, though they
pretend to be mere interpreters of the law. He is content to observe that
any law, whether it be judge-made or properly legislated, may be regarded
as "good" law or "bad" law simply according to whether or not it fairly
represents the prevailing will of the sovereign power-the people.
Mr. Windolph is as fine a democrat as he is a lawyer.
Victor J. Roberts.4

Sra WiLLiAm BIACKSTONE. By David A. Lockmiller. The University of
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1938. Pp. xviii, 3o8. Price:
$3.00.

Dr. Lockmiller, conscious of the fact that his book would be of interest
principally to members of the legal profession, has produced a biography
of Blackstone which is eminently suited to give the average practitioner a
speaking acquaintance with the man who played such an important part in
shaping the common law. The author makes no effort to analyze keenly
every event in Blackstone's life, but rather relates in a very readable style
the surprisingly little which seems to be known about this outstanding man.
When he has no specific knowledge of what Blackstone did as a young man,
the author tells us what the average person of his time did in like circumstances and we may surmise that it is what he did also. In this manner we
are given a sort of cross-section of the legal education available at that time.
Naturally, as the young man began to be successful in his endeavors there
is more definite material available as to his activities.
Blackstone's greatest achievement, the Commentaries, was written from
a series of lectures delivered as the first Vinerian Professor of Law at
Oxdord. Apart from that we find that he was also a successful business
man, a country squire, a member of Parliament, a practicing attorney, and
a judge on the King's Bench and on the Court of Common Pleas. One
chapter is devoted to a rather superficial discussion of the Commentaries
and the biography is concluded with a very interesting discussion of the
influence Blackstone has had on American law. The important sources of
the author's information are included in footnotes, and, in an appendix of
92 pages, some of the writings of Blackstone are set forth in full. While
the book is brief, nevertheless in a day when exhaustive researches are
printed under the guise of biographies, brevity can hardly be called a fault.
R. W., Jr.

t Member of the bar, Montgomery County.
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THE SPIRIT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. By Robert N. Wilkin. Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1938. Pp. viii, 178. Price: $2.50.
All lawyers should welcome Mr. Wilkin's book, for none can read it
without acquiring renewed faith in the nobleness of his profession. With
bench and bar being subjected more and more to unwarranted reproach,
condemned "because of its relatively few derelicts", it is gratifying to find a
champion, who is willing to recognize the evils existing in the profession of
today, yet unwilling to relinquish hope in the ultimate supremacy of that
spirit which has for centuries moved great men to practice, study, and teach
the law.
History supports the author's attitude. As Dean Arant so succinctly
states in his Foreword: ". . . whenever the professional influence has predominated there have been good judges and efficient administration of
justice, and . . . the contrary has been true whenever that influence has
But
been subordinated to imperial, political, or commercial influence."
that is not all. In his concise, and extremely interesting, story of the socalled "struggle for law", Mr. Wilkin attempts to show how most of our
fundamental legal institutions were secured for us primarily through the
efforts of men imbued with the spirit of the legal profession. Rome gave us
the law itself; England freed it from the sovereign will and established the
independent judiciary; the American Constitution placed the judicial power
on a parity with the executive by subjecting "the sovereign will to the
arbitrariment of law"--and common to all these gifts was the same motivating influence.
It is in Part IV of his book, however, that the author's greatest contribution lies. Having stimulated one's pride with his glowing account of the
profession's praiseworthy achievements, the pedestal is knocked out beneath
us with the blunt statement that "the democratic movement, with its inordinate desire for popularity, tended to destroy the ideal of the law and
convert a profession of lawyers into a guild of legal hucksters and political
mountebanks." The professional spirit almost vanished. But Mr. Wilkin
is an optimist; in the remnant of true lawyers who have continued to keep
alive that spirit, he finds the means not only for revitalizing the legal profession, but also for preserving our democratic government. The latter, he
maintains, can only be kept in balance with the forces of evolution, if men
in general are motivated by something like the professional spirit that has
moved and sustained great men of the law. Whether or not Mr. Wilkin's
philosophy is sound, his work will have served its purpose if it succeeds in
promoting similar thought among his contemporaries, both professional and
otherwise.
T.P.G.

